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Professional Women and the Professionalization 
of Motherhood: Marcia Clark's Double Bindt 
D. Kelly Weisberg * 
"[T]he Simpson case has become far more than a murder trial. It is a 
primer on society, whether the topic be race relations, the justice system 
or working women. ,,1 
Introduction 
In the background of the 0.1. Simpson trial lurks a mini-drama. This 
drama will have long-lasting consequences but not for 0.1. Simpson. 
Rather, it will affect the lives of two small boys who are the focus of a 
custody dispute involving Simpson's chief prosecutor Marcia Clark. 
Marcia Clark is one of a number of professional women who are victims 
of a "double bind"; their successful careers become a weapon used against 
them by their ex -husbands in custody disputes. 
This battle is taking place at a critical stage in feminist scholarship. 
Feminist legal theorists are beginning to carve out a niche in the scholarly 
literature regarding the legal regulation of motherhood. 3 Feminist 
theorists have previously explored several important issues: custody, 
t <t? Copyright 1995 D. Kelly Weisberg 
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1. Bettina BoxaH, Marcia Clark's Husband Cites Trial in Custody Fight; Family: He 
Asks to be Named Primary Parent, Saying She Hardly Sees Sons. Case Shows Problems 
o/Working Mothers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Boxall, Marcia Clark's 
Husbandj. 
2. See infra notes 43-128 and accompanying text. 
3. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 26 (1995); MOTHERS IN 
LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); ApPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY To WOMEN'S LIVES: PERSPECTIVES ON SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK AND REPRODUC-
TION (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., forthcoming 1996) (including essays on motherhood by Carol 
Sanger, Dorothy Roberts, Nancy Ehrenreich, Marie Ashe and Naomi Cahn); Symposium, 
Reconstructing Motherhood, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1 (1992). 
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including competing standards (maternal presumption, primary caretaker 
presumption, joint custody);4 the effects of custody reform for women;5 
and the problems facing certain mothers (drug-addicted mothers,6 mothers 
on welfare,7 lesbian mothers,8 battered mothers~. 
4. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the 
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986); Mary Becker, Maternal 
Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 
190-223 (1992); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770-73 (1988) 
[hereinafter Fineman, Dominant Discourse]; Martha Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of 
Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. 
L. REv. 107, 111-18; Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the 
Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291 (1992); 
Elizabeth Scott, Pluralism, Paternal Preference and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 
618-29 (1992); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption 
Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978). 
5. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 79-94 (1991) (trend toward gender neutral 
standards has resulted in mothers losing custody); Bartlett & Stack, supra note 4, at 28-35 
(gender neutral approaches to custody reinforce gender inequality); Mary E. Becker, Prince 
Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 201, 219-24 (gender neutral approaches 
to custody and divorce fail to result in positive changes for women); Martha Fineman, The 
Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 653, 656-66 (1992) (liberal feminist efforts to 
minimize the importance of motherhood have had negative impact on women in custody 
decisions); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used 
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 235, 237 (1982) [hereinafter 
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing] (shift from maternal preference to best interests 
standard has disadvantaged mothers). 
6. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack" 
Abuse, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1213 (1991); Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of 
Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. 
REv. 505, 519-29 (1990); Lisa M. Noller, Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing the 
Ingestion of Controlled Substances During Pregnancy, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
367 (1995); Michelle Oberman, Symposium, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: 
Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505 
(1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, 
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1440-42 (1991). 
7. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 274 (1991); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
19, 30-32 (1995); Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 
CONN. L. REv. 817 (1994) (followed by commentary by Joel F. Handler, Dorothy E. 
Roberts, and Lucie E. White, among others); Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of 
Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and Poor Women, 26 N. ENG. L. REv. 415 
(1991); Joanna K. Weinberg, Poverty, Reproduction, and Autonomy in the Welfare State: 
Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Social Policy Legislation, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 375 
(1992). 
8. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches 
to Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STETSON L. REv. 701 (1994); Kristine 
L. Burke, Redefining Parenthood: Child Custody and Visitation When Nontraditional 
Families Dissolve, 24 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 223 (1994); Nancy D. Polikoff, This 
Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in 
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459 (1990); Ruthann 
Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 
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Legal commentators have also addressed the work/family conflict of 
working mothers lO and of professional womenY Scholars have yet to 
focus, however, on the custody problems confronting professional 
women. 12 Perhaps, feminist legal theorists' long-standing concern with 
issues of race and class13 has led them to neglect the legal problems of 
these individuals not usually thought of as marginalized. 14 
CONN. L. REv. 1377 (1994); Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother is a Legal Stranger to Her 
Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 
135 (1991); Annamay T. Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 
14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185 (1992). 
9. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: 
Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 20-24 (1995); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: 
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041 
(1991). 
10. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1220-26 (1989); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and 
Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in 
Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989); Mary Joe Frog, 
Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. 
L. REV. 55 (1979). 
11. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men 
Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 251 (1989); 
Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis of Family/Work 
Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1263 (1982) [hereinafter Project, Law Firms and Lawyers With 
Children]; Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 
60-64 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1163, 1183-87 (1988). 
For an in-depth comparative study (1960s and present) by a sociologist of the legal 
professional's work/family conflict, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 358-79 
(1993) [hereinafter EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW]. 
12. Empirical research on divorce and custody tends to examine the plight of mothers 
generally. See, e.g., TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS (1986); ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, 
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL & LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992); LENORE J. 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). If professional women 
are among the respondents in these research samples, they are not studied separately. 
13. See, e.g., the essays on essentialism in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 
335-95 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). 
14. Of course, it is a popular misconception that professional women do not experience 
the effects of marginalization. An increasing number of professional women, including 
lawyers, are women of color. African-American women constitute 4.2 % and Hispanic 
women 5.2% of all physicians; African-American women constitute 3.7% and Hispanic 
women 3.3 % of engineers; African-American women constitute 5 % and Hispanic women 
2.9% of college and university teachers; and, African-American women constitute 3.3% 
and Hispanic women 3.1 % of lawyers. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
42 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 176 (Jan. 1995). Professionals who are women of color 
experience dual discrimination. See, e.g., Nina Burleigh, Black Women Lawyers: Coping 
with Dual Discrimination, 74 A.B.A. J. 64 (1988) (African-American women lawyers are 
mistaken frequently for defendants or court reporters). 
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Part I of this article presents the background of the Marcia Clark v. 
Gordon Clark custody battle. Part II examines the available (although, 
admittedly, limited) data on the scope of the custody problems affecting 
women legal professionals. Part III explores gender-based assumptions 
about motherhood that appear to influence custody decision-making which 
involves professional women. Finally, the Conclusion discusses the 
implications of these tentative findings. 
I. Marcia Clark v. Gordon Clark15 
Marcia Clark has been separated for over a year from her computer 
engineer husband, Gordon Clark. After 13 years of marriage, Marcia told 
Gordon on Christmas Day in 1993 that "things weren't working out"16 
and requested that they separate. Shortly thereafter, Gordon moved out of 
the family home.17 He agreed to a trial separation in exchange for his 
wife's promise to postpone filing for divorce for six months. 18 
Marcia Clark kept her promise. On June 9, 1994, three days before 
the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman, Marcia Clark 
filed for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. 19 Simulta-
neously, she petitioned for joint legal custody and joint residential custody 
of the couple's two sons, ages three and five. 20 
The children remained in the family home with their mother, spending 
two evenings each week and alternate weekends with their father. 21 
Marcia Clark relied on a housekeeper, baby-sitters, and preschool 
Moreover, since the professions remain sex-segregated, professional women 
experience problems arising from their being a minority within their chosen occupation. 
For an early discussion of the many ways in which women professionals are marginalized, 
see THE PROFESSIONAL WOMAN 587-665 (Athena Theodore ed., 1971) (essays examining 
problems of women academics, clergy, scientists, architects, engineers, lawyers, artists). 
15. The record of the custody dispute was sealed as of June 14, 1995 (and remains 
sealed at the time of publication). See Bettina Boxall, The 0.1. Simpson Murder Trial; 
Records Sealed in Marcia Clark's Child Custody Dispute; Court: An Order Granting Her 
Request Cites the Need to Protect Two Young Sons. The Ruling is Criticized by her 
Estranged Husband's Attorney, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at A32 [hereinafter Boxall, 
0.1. Simpson Murder Trialj. As a result, the facts of this case, presented infra, are derived 
from media accounts. 
16. You Have to Care/or the Kids, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1995, at 35 (interview with 
Gordon Clark). Another newspaper account claims that Marcia told Gordon that "she did 
not find him intellectually stimulating enough and she wanted him to move out." Roni 
Rabin, The Marcia and Gordon Clark Custody Case Raises the Question: Why Does 
Society Presume Mom Gets the Kids?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1995, at B4. 
17. Rabin, supra note 16. 
18. Id. 
19. Joan Beck, Marcia Clark's Most Important Case Isn't 0.1., BERGEN RECORD, Mar. 
21, 1995, at D07. 
20. Rabin, supra note 16. 
21. Id. 
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providers to care for the boys when she was working. 22 Pursuant to a 
voluntary agreement, Gordon (who earns $54,586 annually compared to 
Marcia's $96,829)23 paid child support of approximately $1200 per 
month. Eventually, when he located permanent living arrangements, he 
reduced that payment by a half. 24 
Due to escalating costs of living, Marcia Clark requested in December 
of 1994 that Gordon reinstate the original child support amount. 25 In 
particular, she cited increasing child care costs. "I have been working a 
six - or seven-day week for as many as sixteen hours per day," she 
asserted. She continued, "I now need baby-sitters for the weekends while 
I work and someone to spend the evenings with my two children."26 She 
also pleaded for an increase in support because of trial-related costs: 
Because of the notoriety of the trial with press and television 
coverage, I have purchased five new suits and shoes at a cost of 
$1,500. I am under constant scrutiny and on public display. It 
has been necessary for me to have my hair styled as needed and 
to spend more money on my personal care and grooming. As I 
am a county employee, none of these expenses are reimbursed.27 
The issue of Marcia Clark's child care resurfaced at the end of 
February. When Judge Lance Ito attempted to schedule a late Friday 
session, the prosecutor requested that the session be cancelled because of 
her problem arranging child care. 28 The following Monday, she was 
22. BoxalI, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. 
One or both of the children also attend preschool. See Adam Pertman, Clark May Have 
to Do Battle to Keep Children, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1995, at 6 (Clark requested 
additional funds for children's pickup after school). 
23. Rabin, supra note 16. 
24. Id. 
25. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. 
26. Id. (citing Marcia Clark from court documents). Clark requested an increase in 
support payments to pay for weekend baby-sitters when she worked, at a cost of $200 per 
month (costs in addition to the salary of her regular housekeeper), and $150 per month for 
teachers to pick her children up from school. Pertman, supra note 22. 
27. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1 (citing Marcia Clark from court 
documents) . 
28. David Behrens, Whose Custody Is It, Anyway? The Answer These Days Isn't Always 
Mom's, NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1995, at B4. 
The exchange with Judge Ito follows: 
Marcia Clark: I'm not arguing with the court's authority to do that, 
but, Your Honor, I just-I can't be here. 
Judge Ito: I had completely forgotten about Miss Clark's child care 
obligations. 
20120: A Working Mom's Nightmare-Mother Loses Child Custody, (ABC television 
broadcast, May 12, 1995) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script file [hereinafter ABC 
Transcript] . 
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forced to defend herself against charges by defense attorney Johnny L. 
Cochran, Jr., that she had used the issue of child care as a ruse in order 
to delay the testimony of Simpson's alibi witness Rosa Lopez.29 Clark 
countered that she was "offended as a woman, as a single parent, as a 
prosecutor and as an officer of the court."3O 
That same day, Gordon Clark filed a petition seeking temporary 
primary custody. 31 He alleged that his ex-wife's work schedule was 
harming the children. He claimed that, at most, she saw the children an 
hour a day during the week. 32 "[She] is never home and never has any 
time to spend with them, "33 he asserted. "I have personal knowledge that 
on most nights she does not arrive home until 10 p.m. and even when she 
is home, she is working," he also claimed. 34 He continued, "[ w ]hile I 
commend [Marcia Clark's] brilliance, her legal ability and her tremendous 
competence as an attorney, I do not want our children to continue to suffer 
because she is never home, and never has any time to spend with 
them. ,,35 
In contrast, he said "I work regular hours from 8 to 6, "36 and 
claimed to arrive home by 6: 15 almost every night. 37 He argued that 
"[t]here's no reason why they [the children] shouldn't be with me instead 
of constantly being with baby-sitters. "38 
Following several press interviews by Gordon Clark,39 Marcia Clark 
Newspaper accounts recorded Clark's distress at the encounter. She "trembled and 
her voice cracked .... [She] faltered only when Judge Lance Ito began talking eight days 
ago about extending the trial into the evening, when Clark's two young sons would be 
expecting her home." Custody Case-Careers vs. Parenting, Husband's Suit Puts New 
Spotlight on Marcia Clark, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1995, at AS. 
29. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. See also Lynnell Hancock et aI., 
Putting Working Moms in Custody, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 54. 
30. Cited in Behrens, supra note 2S. In a subsequent declaration filed with the court, 
Gordon Clark stated that his ex-wife deceived the court in claiming that she had child care 
problems. He maintained that he was supposed to pick up the children for his usual 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. Hancock et aI., supra note 29. 
However, according to a media account, Marcia Clark's friends claim that her 
difficulty with child care arose because she routinely prefers to drop off the children 
herself, "[p]artly because Gordon often neglects to pick them up on time; partly because 
she wants to say goodbye and explain what's happening to the children." Id. 
31. Hancock et al., supra note 29. 
32. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. 
33. Hancock et al., supra note 29. 
34. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1 (citing Gordon Clark's Superior Court 
declaration of February 24, 1995). 
35. [d. 
36. Rabin, supra note 16. 
37. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. 
3S. Rabin, supra note 16. See also Beck, supra note 19. 
39. Gordon Clark held a two and one-half hour interview with Newsweek in April 1995. 
You Have to Carejor the Kids, supra note 16. He also sold a two-part story to the tabloid, 
The Globe. Boxall, 0.1. Simpson Murder Trial, supra note 15. 
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requested that the court seal the record. On June 14, 1995, Superior Court 
Commissioner Keith M. Clemens granted Clark's request. 40 Commis-
sioner Clemens closed the proceedings, barred the parties and their 
attorneys from publicly discussing the issues and, prohibited the parties 
from making public statements about the children or about each other's 
parenting. 41 A hearing on the custody and visitation issues has not taken 
place. 42 
II. Professional Women and Custody: Scope of the Problem43 
Marcia Clark's custody dilemma is a by-product of the problems 
confronting mothers who are professional women. Research has identified 
several problems encountered by professional women that stem from the 
work/family conflict.44 As one commentator has remarked: "Profession-
al careers are designed not for women with families, but rather for men 
who are free of family obligations. "45 Studies emphasize that profession-
al women constantly worry about juggling work and family demands, and 
must make many accommodations to meet these conflicting demands. 46 
In mid-June 1995, Gordon Clark publicly stated that since his wife's work schedule had 
changed, he would be content with joint custody. Id. 
40. Boxall, 0.1. Simpson Murder Trial, supra note 15. 
41. /d. 
42. Telephone Interview with Judy R. Forman, Mannatt, Phelps & Phillips, counsel for 
Marcia Clark (Jan. 3, 1996). 
43. Because of the absence of empirical data, it may be premature to attempt to delineate 
the "scope" of this problem. The few cases discussed here do reveal, however, remarkable 
similarities in terms of judicial bias against professional women, specifically, and working 
women in general, in terms of custody decision-making. As such, these cases appear to 
shed light on an emerging socio-Iegal problem. 
44. See generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EpSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS 
IN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (1973); EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11; Ellen V. 
Futter, Women Professionals: The Slow Rise to the Top, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 965 (1989); 
Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, A Commentary on State 
Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941 (1991); Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal 
Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. 
REv. 1209 (1988) [hereinafter Project, Gender, Legal Education]; Project, Law Firms and 
Lawyers with Children, supra note 11, at 1273-76; Rhode, Perspectives on Professional 
Women, supra note 11, at 1178-79 (reviewing the literature). 
Research reveals that, despite recent gains, the most prestigious professions (law, 
medicine, college and university teachers) continue to be male-dominated. Debra Renee 
Kaufman, Professional Women: How Real Are the Recent Gains?, in FEMINIST 
PHILOSOPHIES 150 (Janet A. Kourany et al. eds., 1992). On sex segregation in the legal 
profession, see EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note II, at 107-11; Rhode, Gender and 
Professional Roles, supra note 11, at 58-59. Moreover, even among female-dominated 
professions (elementary and high school teaching, social work, nurses, librarians), men 
occupy higher positions. Kaufman, supra, at 151. Kaufman points out that African-
American professional women, especially, are affected by this pattern. Id. 
45. Kaufman, supra note 44, at 156. 
46. EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11, at 318,358-66 (noting that women's "big 
management problem" is how to care for their children; noting also that lawyers adjust 
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Professional women also experience the work/family conflict upon 
divorce. Over a decade ago, a journalist called the divorced lawyer-parent 
an "endangered species. "47 Anecdotal accounts in the media continue to 
highlight the problems of some divorced women lawyers. Marcia Clark's 
case is one of four cases involving lawyer-mothers (discussed infra) that 
have garnered considerable public attention. 
Last year, Sharon Prost, chief counsel for the Republicans on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, lost custody of her two children to her 
husband, Kenneth Greene, after a costly and lengthy legal battle.48 Prost 
married Greene in 1984. In 1992, she left the family home with the 
couple's two sons (then ages five and two) and filed for a civil protection 
order against Greene. 49 
At the time of their separation, Prost was working long hours for 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), Chairperson of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee during the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas. 50 Her husband, a labor union administrator who had 
been unemployed for over two years, had recently accepted a job as the 
Assistant Executive Director of the American Federation of Television and 
Radio Artists and Screen Actors Guild. Although his salary was only half 
that of Prost's, his hours were more flexible than hers. 51 
When the marriage dissolved, Prost petitioned for sole custody. 
Greene petitioned for joint custody. According to District of Columbia 
procedure, a court may not award joint custody if one party objects (as 
Prost did). 52 Ultimately, District of Columbia Superior Court Judge 
their careers to their families' needs); Chambers, supra note 11, at 257-58 nn. 35 & 36 
(despite their difficulties, women professionals report a high degree of satisfaction with 
their lives); Gellis, supra note 44, at 957 (women lawyers cited repeated concerns about 
the need to accommodate family and career demands); Project, Gender, Legal Education, 
supra note 44, at 1227-31, 1257 (women are more likely than men to experience stress 
associated with work/family conflict and may limit job choices to those offering maternity 
leave and flexible schedules); Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 11, 
at 1182-87 (women are forced to compromise either caretaking values or professional 
success in order to meet demands of work and family). 
47. See Lynn HechtSchafran, Lawyer-Parent: Endangered Species, 2 NAT'L. LJ., Apr. 
14, 1980, at 15. 
48. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995). In Fall 1994, the Senate 
Ethics Committee created a legal defense fund for Prost. Generally, such funds are 
reserved for Senate members. Senate staffers provided $13,920 toward Prost's legal fees 
and costs. Gabriel Kahn, Prost Fund Takes in Nearly 14G, Mostly from Hatch Supporters, 
Lobbyists, ROLL CALL, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file. 
49. 652 A.2d at 623. 
50. Robin Abcarian, As Standards Go, This One's a Double, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8,1995, 
at El. Cf Beck, supra note 19. 
51. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 623-24. 
52. Hancock et aI., supra note 29. The District of Columbia does not provide, by 
statute, for joint custody. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(1995) (general list of factors 
relevant to custody determination). 
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Harriet Taylor ruled that, although both parents were fit and had been 
equally responsible for the children in the early years of the marriage, 
Greene was the more suitable custodian. The court reasoned that Greene 
had "prioritized the care and well-being of his children, ,,53 whereas Prost 
was "simply more devoted to and absorbed by her work and her career 
than anything else in her life, including . . . her children and her 
family. "54 
The trial court based its conclusion, in part, on the testimony of the 
couple's au pair. The au pair testified that Prost generally arrived home 
at around seven or eight p.m. ,55 the family ate dinner together only four 
or five times per year,56 and that it was a "special event"57 when Prost 
came home early to cook dinner. According to the au pair, Prost usually 
ate alone late at night, often "while sitting on the kitchen floor ... talking 
on the telephone or writing while she was eating. "58 
The appellate court found that Greene was the more nurturing and 
involved parent. In support, the court cited Greene's refusal of two job 
offers, ostensibly in order to spend more time with the children;59 his 
involvement in the children's school functions;60 and the choreographing 
of his son's birthday party.61 
While the appellate court rejected Prost's arguments that the trial 
court's "reasoning is infected with gender stereotyping"62 and that it had 
overemphasized Greene's role in raising his two sons,63 it did rule that 
the trial court "failed to resolve factual issues concerning the appellant's 
claims of physical assault,,64 and thereby remanded the case. 65 In a 
concurring opinion in Prost, Associate Judge Schwelb suggested that the 
majority had overlooked a number of factors that cast Greene in a different 
light: Greene's deceptive conduct in terms of backdating a document, 
excising language from a document, falsifying support records to obtain 
funds from Prost, and possibly perjuring himself regarding his physical 
assaults on his wife. Judge Schwelb admitted that "[t]he husband is 
apparently a good deal more relaxed and smoother than the wife is in 
53. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 630. 
54. [d. at 629. 
55. [d. at 624. 
56. [d. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 630. 
60. [d. at 630 n.18. 
61. [d. at 630 n.21. 
62. [d. at 623. 
63. [d. at 629. 
64. [d. at 623. 
65. [d. 
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handling the boys. But, especially in this kind of case, in which the future 
of the children is in the balance, character counts tOO."66 Upon remand, 
the trial court, unpersuaded by the evidence of domestic violence, upheld 
the earlier decision. 67 The case is now being appealed to the D. C. Court 
of Appeals. 68 
In another recent case, an appellate court reversed two lower court 
rulings in determining that Renee B., an attorney for a large multinational 
corporation in New York City, should lose custody of her eleven-year-old 
daughter, Rebecca. 69 In 1986, after a five-year marriage to Michael B., 
Renee filed for divorce and sole custody of Rebecca; the Family Court 
granted both motions. 70 At that time, Renee retained custody of their 
daughter. Renee's custody of Rebecca was twice confirmed by a New 
York Family Court. 71 
Following the divorce, Michael began a pattern of harassment toward 
his ex-wife that the New York Family Court termed "guerilla warfare. "72 
The court recounted: 
The father's campaign has involved a chronic pattern of deceit, 
and harassment of the mother, including, inter alia his collusive 
interactions with Dr. Gardner [the husband's psychiatric expert 
who interviewed the child without the mother's consent]; inordi-
nate pressure to undermine the mother's custodial management; 
pressure directed at the child's school officials; pressure to 
sabotage the child's psychotherapeutic treatment [by exerting 
pressure on the child to refuse to see a therapist]; withholding 
child support; and recurrent motions embroiling the mother in 
continuous litigation concerning visitation arrangements, etc. 73 
66. [d. at 633-34. 
67. Telephone Interview with Charles F. C. Ruff, Covington and Burling, counsel for 
Sharon Prost (July 7, 1995). See also Prost v. Greene, No. 94-FM-I090 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 21, 1995) (affirming original decision upon remand). 
68. Prost v. Greene, No. 95FM450, 98FM492 (D.C. filed July 10, 1995). According 
to a recent television interview, Prost "is going to try to get the case re-opened, and that 
will be based on the fact that, after Labor Day, she's going to reduce her work hours to 
nine to three. She's also going to be taking a 15-percent pay cut. She hopes that may 
influence the court in her favor." ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 9. 
69. Renee B. v. Michael B., 611 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), motion/or leave 
to appeal denied, Blum v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1217 (N.Y. 1994). 
70. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V5272186, slip. op. at 2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
71. [d. at 2, 121. See also Myrna Felder, The "Rentschler" and "Renee B. " Revolution, 
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 1994, at 3. 
72. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 119 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
73. [d. at 118. 
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Despite Michael's considerable financial resources of over one million 
dollars, he consistently failed to pay child support-a failure that the 
Family Court characterized as "sadistic behavior. "74 He was twice held 
in contempt and was once incarcerated for failing to pay support. 75 
In 1992, following Renee's discovery that Michael was sleeping in the 
same bed as Rebecca, Renee petitioned the court to eliminate Michael's 
right to mid-week overnight visitation and to impose a requirement that 
Michael's visitation be supervised.76 Michael cross-petitioned for sole 
custody. The Family Court judge denied Michael's cross-petition and 
affirmed Renee's right to sole custody. 77 
In ruling on Michael's cross-petition, Family Court Judge George L. 
Jurow was not persuaded by either Michael's expert witness or by the 
court-appointed expert who testified that "the child was 'distressed by her 
mother's unpredictable moods.' "78 The court determined that the child 
had been influenced by "excessive paternal pressure,,79 to state a prefer-
ence to reside with her father. 
The trial judge characterized the mother as expressive, empathetic, 
compassionate, "open, direct, and sincere."80 The court pointed out that: 
the credible evidence is that the child loves her mother and 
interacts well with her, and is supported by the mother in 
numerous social and other activities appropriate for the child's 
development. In other words, the custodial parenting has enabled 
the child to thrive. 81 
The court also disregarded the court-appointed expert's testimony 
which stated that the husband was a more fit custodian because of Renee's 
career. 82 The judge noted that even Michael's expert witness had 
characterized one of Renee's greatest assets by saying that, "the time 
Rebecca spends with her mother is 'high quality time. ,,,83 
In contrast, the court described Michael as "cold, pedantic, and 
humorless . . . with a pervasive quality of controlled anger."84 Accord-
ing to the court, Michael was socially isolated and had difficulties dealing 
74. [d. at 113. 
75. [d. at 5. 
76. [d. at 2. 
77. [d. at 2, 21. 
78. [d. at 13. 
79. [d. at 120. 
80. [d. at 106. 
81. [d. at 116-17. 
82. [d. at 91-92. 
83. [d. at 28 (emphasis in the original). 
84. [d. at 108. 
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with people. 85 In particular, the court pointed to Michael's interaction 
with his daughter's school officials that had resulted in Michael being 
asked to leave the premises,86 jeopardizing his daughter's continued 
enrollment in the school,87 and precipitating a court order excluding him 
from involvement in the child's school activities. 88 
The court also emphasized the father's intention, should he gain 
custody, to remove the daughter from her present school, the school that 
a mental health expert had testified was "the most important arena"89 of 
the daughter's life. The trial court concluded that to "transfer the child's 
custody to the father who, it is clear from the credible evidence, will take 
actions inimical to the child's future welfare, is clearly erroneous and not 
in the child's best interests. ,,90 
Michael appealed the Family Court ruling. 91 In May 1994, the New 
York Appellate Division awarded Michael sole legal custody with liberal 
visitation rights to Renee. The appellate court based its reversal on the 
lower court's lack of deference to the opinion of the court-appointed 
psychiatric expert,92 Rebecca's preference to live with her father, 
Rebecca's distress because of her mother's "spanking, slapping, and 
locking of the child in her room, "93 and the attempts by Renee to exclude 
Michael from the child's life. 94 
This custody battle cost Renee approximately $340,000.95 The stress 
of the fight also resulted in Renee losing her job.96 Further proceedings 
are still pending. 97 
85. [d. at 111. 
86. [d. at 39-40. 
87. [d. at 40. 
88. [d. at 90. 
89. [d. at 19. 
90. [d. at 11 7 . 
91. Renee B. v. Michael B., 611 N.Y.S.2d at 83l. 
92. [d. at 832. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. The court was also swayed by the court-appointed expert's thoroughness in 
reaching his opinion-meeting with the child on three occasions as well as with each of the 
parents in conjunction with the child. It gave little weight to the mother's expert who had 
interviewed only her and the persons she selected. [d. 
95. Lisa Genasci, Working Mothers at Risk in Custody Disputes; Divorce: Scholars Say 
Courts Often Hold Women to Higher Parenting Standards than Their Ex-Spouses, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at A8. 
96. [d. 
97. Subsequent to the appellate court ruling, Michael attempted to hold Renee in 
contempt for failure to pay child support as ordered by the appellate court in 1994. Having 
difficulty complying with service of process on Renee, Michael decided to have the process 
server accompany Rebecca on her visitation to her mother. Upon reading the legal papers, 
12-year-old Rebecca became distraught at the threat of imprisonment of her mother. The 
daughter, on her own initiative, contacted her court-appointed guardian and refused to 
return to her father. In subsequent sessions with her social worker, the daughter described 
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Another prominent case that incensed the legal community98 involved 
Linda Tresnak, a woman law student. At the time of Linda's marriage to 
Jim, Jim worked for his father's insurance agency; she worked in a 
nursing home.99 After Linda gave birth to their two sons (in 1969 and 
1971), she became a full-time homemaker. lOo In 1969, the couple sold 
their house and Jim returned to college. 101 During the course of their 
fifteen-year marriage, the couple moved twice in order to accommodate 
Jim's teaching career. 102 
In the summer of 1975, Jim began work on a master's degree at 
Northeast Missouri State University in Kirksville, MissourL I03 He 
attended summer courses and worked in nearby Chariton, Missouri, during 
the school year.l04 During this time, Linda also decided to continue her 
education; she attended the local junior college. I05 Subsequently, she too 
enrolled full-time at the University of Kirksville and received a bachelor's 
degree in psychology. 106 Because Linda attended classes in a town 
distant from Jim's employment, the couple lived apart, and their two sons 
(then aged nine and seven) resided alternately with each parent. 107 When 
the boys lived with Jim, Linda returned home every weekend to cook, 
clean, and help with the children's schoolwork. 108 
her life with her father as verging on parental abuse. Also, she was prohibited from calling 
her mother and was required to disclose all correspondence to her father in order to prevent 
her from sending letters to her mother. 
In July 1995, Rebecca and her court-appointed guardian motioned for a change in 
custody to Renee. The trial court issued a preliminary order appointing a new court-
appointed expert, ordering Rebecca to remain in her mother's custody temporarily, and 
decreeing that the father have supervised visitation. The father refused visitation under 
these conditions. A formal hearing was scheduled in August 1995. The matter was stayed, 
subsequently, when the father claimed that the newly-appointed court psychiatrist was 
biased against him. Custody remains with the mother pending a ruling on the father's 
claim. Telephone Interviews with Bernard H. Clair, Attorney, Clair and Danielle, New 
York, N.Y. (July 7, 1995 & Feb. 14, 1996). 
98. The Women Law Students and Staff, University of Iowa College of Law, the 
National Lawyers Guild, Iowa City Chapter, and the Faculty of the University of Iowa 
College of Law filed amici briefs on Linda Tresnak's behalf. In re Marriage of Tresnak, 
297 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Iowa 1980). 
99. Id. at 110. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. In 1970, they moved to Omaha in order for Jim to take a position at a private 
girls' college. In 1971, they moved to Chariton, Missouri, where Jim began teaching high 
school business classes. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 111. 
105. Id. at 110. 
106. Id. at 110-11. 
107. Id. at 111. From January to May 1978, they resided with Jim in Chariton. From 
Fall 1978 to Spring 1979, they resided with Linda in Kirksville. 
108. Id. at 113. 
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At the time of the couple's separation in 1980, Linda had decided to 
attend law schoo1. 109 She was admitted to the University of Iowa 
College of Law. 110 When Linda filed for divorce, Jim argued that he 
should have custody of the boys because long hours of law study would 
leave Linda little time for their two sons.l1I The trial court agreed, 
concluding that Linda's pursuit of a professional degree would be 
detrimental to the children. Il2 The court explained that "anyone who has 
attained a legal education can well appreciate the time that legal studies 
consume. "113 The court continued: "Although this is commendable 
insofar as her ambition for a career is concerned . . . it is not in the best 
interests and welfare of her minor children." 114 
The trial court determined that Jim would be the most suitable 
custodian because he had a stable occupation and salaryYs The trial 
court also reasoned that Jim would be more likely "to engage in various 
activities with the boys, such as athletic events, fishing, hunting, 
mechanical training and other activities that boys are interested in." 116 
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed. The court determined 
that the record did not support the concern that Linda's legal education 
109. Id. at 111. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. (citing Jim's argument In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425 , slip op. (D. 
Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 1979)). 
112. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425, slip op. (D. Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 
1979»). 
113. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425, slip op. (D. Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 
1979)). 
In a more recent case involving another woman lawyer (Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 
29 (W. Va. 1991», a circuit court used similar reasoning to reverse a family law master's 
award of custody to the mother. The circuit judge commented as follows: 
[This] Court recognizes the plaintiff's employment as one filled with much 
opportunity and demand. However, lucrative careers often do not leave 
much more room for flexibility. The Court respects the plaintiff's desire 
to devote after hours to the children but recognizes the practical aspects of 
that expressed intention. The law profession is by no means comparable to 
any 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. job. The profession requires the availability 
and time flexibility that the plaintiff claims she will not sacrifice for the 
sake of the children . . . . 
Id. at 33 n.3 (citing circuit court's memorandum order). 
The West Virginia Supreme Court subsequently reversed the circuit court on the 
grounds that the mother had been the children's primary caretaker since the children's birth 
and since the separation of the parties. Id. at 33. 
114. Tresnak, 297 N. W.2d at 111 (citing In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425, slip 
op. (D. Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 1979)). 
115. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425, slip op. (D. Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 
1979». 
116. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Tresnak, No. DM425, slip op. (D. Lucas Cty. Aug. 31, 
1979). 
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would be harmful to her children.1I7 The court reasoned, based on the 
record, that Linda was more likely than Jim to engage in recreational 
activities with the childrenYs Moreover, the court contrasted Jim's lack 
of concern with cleanliness with Linda's performance of household duties 
even during her undergraduate education. 119 The Iowa Supreme Court 
criticized the trial court for basing its decision on assumptions about law 
school l20 and on unfounded gender stereotypes. 121 
The above cases represent a small sample in which women lawyers (or 
law students) have been threatened with a denial of custody because of the 
demands of their careers. Of course, such custody deprivations are not 
limited to women lawyers. Cases involve divorced women in other 
professions,122 managerial specialties,l23 and occupations,124 as well 
as working mothers who leave their children in day care. l25 Men who 
are professionals rarely appear to lose custody for this reason. 126 
117. Id. at 113. 
118. Id. at 112. In the past, Linda had taken the boys fishing, whereas Jim had refused 
to do so. Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court said that there was no evidence showing that 
the boys enjoyed hunting or mechanical training. Id. 
119. Id. at 113. 
120. Id. at 112. 
121. Id. at 113. 
122. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 219 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Neb. 1974) (award to father 
upheld because mother-medical student had "little time which could be devoted to the care 
of the children"); Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589 (Kan. 1978) (businesswoman denied 
custody); Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (architect lost 
custody at trial level but appellate court reversed). 
123. See, e.g., Gulyas v. Gulyas, 254 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. App. 1977) (supervisor denied 
custody); Hansen v. Hansen, 327 N.W.2d 47 (S.D. 1982) (broker lost custody). 
124. See Alice Steinbach, Career VS. Children: Women Face Difficult Choice, Custody 
Wars, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 13, 1995, at 1D (citing the case of a Mississippi flight 
attendant who lost custody because her ex-husband had a more regular work schedule); 
Elinor J. Brecher, Working Mothers Losing Custody; Double Standard? Increasingly, Job-
Related Complications that Never Cause a Ripple of Trouble for Men in Custody Cases are 
Swamping Women, POST & COURIER (Charleston, SC), Mar. 12, 1995, at A6 (citing case 
of real estate agent who lost custody). 
125. In a wen-publicized recent case, an unmarried mother (Jennifer Ireland) lost custody 
of her toddler to the child's father because the mother was a university student who relied 
on day care. In contrast, the father, who worked part-time and took classes at a local 
community college, had a mother who was willing to care for the child in her home. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals subsequently overturned the circuit court order that had granted 
custody to the father. Ireland v. Smith, No. 177431, 1995 WL 662889 (Mich. App. Nov. 
7, 1995). See Susan Chira, Custody Case Stirs Debate on Bias Against Working Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at 31; Anna Quindlin, Done In By Day Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 1994, at 19. See also Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (custody 
award cannot be based on father's superior financial resources or mother's reliance on day 
careibaby-sitters while she works and studies). 
On bias against working mothers, see generally Becker, supra note 4, at 177 & nn. 
171-72. 
126. In February 1980, the New York Appellate Division upheld an award of custody to 
the mother because the father, a partner in a law firm, "must spend many and irregular 
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Social forces (namely, the increase in the numbers of professional 
women, the rising incidence of divorce, the percentage of divorced 
mothers in the workforce)127 and the current social and legal focus on 
"the bad mother"128 make the issue of custody denial to working women 
especially timely. The next part of this article questions the extent to 
which such custody deprivations present an issue of gender-based 
discrimination. It explores the assumptions and stereotypes about 
motherhood that appear to influence custody decision-making involving 
professional women. 
III. A Feminist Dilemma?: The Importance of Perspective 
"This is not about feminism. It's about kids and their par-
ents. "129 
"To demand that Marcia Clark give up the best job opportunity 
she will ever have or risk losing her sons is to put a successful 
woman in a desperate bind that would never be imposed on a 
successful man." 130 
The quotations above raise the issue whether the dilemma confronting 
Marcia Clark and other women lawyers constitutes gender-based discrimi-
nation. On one hand, one might argue that this is not an issue of gender 
hours working." Cited in Schafran, supra note 47, at 15. Of course, it is possible that 
fathers who are professionals may not request custody because of their career demands. 
Alternatively, custody denials to these fathers may be based on reasoning that implicitly 
takes into account their careers. 
127. See infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., JANE SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL 
REALITIES OF MOTHERING (1991); SHARI L. THURER, THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD: 
How CULTURE REINVENTS THE GoOD MOTHER (1994); Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers, " 
"Good Lawyers, "and "Legal Ethics," 81 GEO. L.J. 2533 (1993); Marie Ashe, The "Bad 
Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem 0/ Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 
(1992); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem/or Feminist Theory, 2 
TEXAS J. WOMEN & L. 75, 83-93(1993) (discussing the applicability of the "bad mother" 
idea in popular culture and social science research to the legal treatment of child abuse); 
Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers and the State: Children on the Margins, 
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1995). 
Another well-publicized illustration of the "bad mother" involves the recent case of 
Susan Smith, a North Carolina woman who drowned her two young sons. See Rick Bragg, 
Mother Who Killed: Loss, Betrayal and a Search/or a Fairy Tale Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 
9, 1995, at 16; Donna Dixon, Susan Smith, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at B6. 
129. Mike Littwin, Clark VS. Clark Means Hard Choices and Tough Luck, BALTIMORE 
SUN, Mar. 6, 1995, at lD. Interestingly, this viewpoint was expressed also by Sharon 
Prost's husband. In an interview, he remarked: "I do not view this as a father's rights 
issue. I do not view this as a mother's right [sic] issue. It's the right of children .... " 
ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 9. 
130. Beck, supra note 19. 
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inequality; rather, it simply concerns children's best interests. 131 On the 
other hand, one might argue that such custody decisions constitute 
discriminatory treatment by imposing a burden upon some women that is 
not imposed upon similarly situated men. 132 These different points of 
view highlight feminist legal theory's critique of neutrality. 
One of the epistemological contributions of feminist legal theory is the 
debunking of the myth of neutrality. This myth suggests that we, as 
observers of the human condition, can be neutral and objective. Feminist 
legal theorists, however, emphasize the influence of the observer's 
perspective on what is observed. 133 
Feminist methods constitute part of a larger intellectual movement that 
rejects such longstanding methodological principles as the positivist 
empirical tradition in science. 134 The positivist tradition (based on the 
scientific method utilized in such disciplines as astronomy, biology, 
chemistry, and physics) utilizes empirical evidence, experimentation, 
verification and deductive logic. It assumes that through observation and 
measurement by an objective observer, we can obtain reliable infonnation 
about reality. 
Feminist theory challenges this tradition and its underlying assump-
tions. Feminist methods reject the idea of a subject-object relationship that 
is detached and neutral because the law is not an objective, neutral 
discourse. Rather, feminist legal theorists believe that we are always 
influenced by our perspective. 
Each of the opposing points of view regarding the Clark custody 
dispute, as expressed at the beginning of this section, rests on certain 
assumptions. This section attempts to delineate and analyze those 
assumptions. Specifically, it attempts to explore and challenge the 
gendered nature of the reasoning behind these conflicting viewpoints. The 
first view (that the Clarks' dispute does not implicate gender inequality) 
rests on a belief that time should be a determinative factor in custody 
decisions, i. e., that children fare better with the parent who has more time 
to be with them. Upon first glance, this appears to be a gender neutral 
assumption that emphasizes children's best interests. Yet, as I will 
131. Littwin, supra note 129. 
132. Beck, supra note 19. 
133. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of 
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 895-906 (1989); 
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARv. L. REv. 10, 45-50 (1987); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurispru-
dence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986). 
134. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 
828, 872-77 (1990). See also D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction, in FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 529-31 (introduction to chapter on feminist legal 
methods). 
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explain, this assumption is gendered at its core. The contrary position 
(that this custody problem of professional women raises an issue of gender 
inequality) rests on a different foundation. This view is based on the 
conflicting role expectations that stem from imagery of the hardworking 
father ("a good provider") versus that of the professional woman/mother 
("a bad mother"), as I will also explain. 
A. GENDER NEUTRALITY AT WORK? TIME AS A FACTOR IN CUSTODY 
DECISION-MAKING 
In custody determinations, the governing standard is the best interests 
of the child.135 Although state laws vary, both parent-related and child-
related factors are considered relevant in determinations of the best 
interests of the child. 136 Only occasionally is "time" enumerated as a 
statutory factor. 137 More often, consideration of parental availability 
enters into the determination implicitly, either because of vague statutory 
language138 or because of the tremendous discretion vested by the best 
interests standard in decision-makers' determinations of parental fitness. 
The argument, as raised by Gordon Clark and the aforementioned ex-
husbands of legal professionals, is that a parent's limited availability 
because of career demands should militate against an award of custody. 
Several problems arise in utilizing time as a determinative, or even 
relevant, factor. 
First, and most obviously, reliance on this factor emphasizes the 
quantity, rather than quality, of the parent's interaction with the child. As 
one commentator cautions: 
A standard that awards custody to the parent able to spend more 
time with the child would ignore qualitative differences in time 
135. For commentary criticizing this standard as subjective and indeterminate, see Becker, 
supra note 4, at 172-75; David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rulesfor Custody 
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 480-86 (1984; Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 255-62 (1975). 
136. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 797-814 (2d ed. 1988); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, 
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 
819-43 (3d ed. 1995). 
137. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(A) (1994) ("actual time spent with each 
parent"). 
138. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(c) (1993) ("amount of contact"); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-09-06.2(b) (1991 & Supp 1993) ("capacity and disposition of the parties to give 
the child love, affection, and guidance"). See also Milton v. Dennis, 464 N.Y.S.2d 874, 
875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (the "availability of the parents" is a factor in the determina-
tion of custody). 
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spent with the child and thus might not be justifiable from the 
perspective of what is good for the child. 139 
313 
The quantity of time that a parent has available to spend with a child 
neither dictates the quality of that interaction nor guarantees that the 
available time will, in fact, be spent with the child. For example, research 
on mother-child versus father-child relationships reveals that husbands of 
working wives spend considerably less time than the working mothers in 
child-care activities. 140 Fathers' interactions differ qualitatively, too. 
Fathers tend to interact more with their young children in play rather than 
in the performance of routine caretaking tasks. 141 Research has also 
suggested that, at the time of divorce, fathers often overestimate the time 
they say they want to spend with their children. A certified family law 
specialist told a committee studying gender bias in the legal profession that 
a father will "quite frequently" 142 suggest that joint physical custody is 
important to him: 
[H]e wants not only quality time, but quantity time with his 
children. . .. Now, one thing that I'm finding quite often is that 
dad says that, and dad gets that ... , All of a sudden he's on a 
more traditional, once every other weekend, once a month, maybe 
on Christmas, all of a sudden the children aren't hearing from dad 
at all .... 143 
Research that documents visitation patterns over time supports this 
finding,l44 At the end of the third year after a divorce, there was a 
declining rate of visitation by fathers in terms of overnight visits, daytime 
visitation, and regular visitation during the school year.145 
In addition, a focus on the quantity of time that a child spends with a 
parent may detract from more important considerations. For example, in 
139. Mnookin, supra note 135, at 284. 
140. Ross A. Thompson, The Father's Case in Child Custody Disputes: The Contributions 
of Psychological Research, in FATHERHOOD AND F AMIL Y POLICY 53, 65 (Michael E. Lamb 
& Abraham Sagi eds., 1983) (reviewing research). 
141. [d. at 65. Research also revealed that working mothers spend considerable time with 
their children in the early evening period, "using this time to reestablish contact with their 
babies after having been away for the day." [d. at 75. Fathers, who were also returning 
from work, gave more attention to their wives than to the children. [d. 
142. Hon. Meredith C. Taylor, Achieving Equal Justice in Family Law, in ACHIEVING 
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS: THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITfEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 21 (1990) [hereinafter 
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE]. The committee noticed this factor was "readily recognized 
by the attorneys who participated in the regional meetings and public hearings." [d. 
143. [d. at 22. 
144. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at 162-202. 
145. [d. at 172-73. 
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Renee B., a court-appointed expert determined that the unemployed father 
would be a better custodian than the mother because of his greater 
availability. 146 In awarding custody to the father, the appellate court 
gave little weight to the father's character, which had been described by 
the trial judge as, "cold, pedantic, and humorless, and above all, with a 
pervasive quality of controlled anger. "147 The judge continued, "[e]ven 
when directly discussing his daughter, there was little sense of the warmth 
and empathy for her that the mother displayed." 148 In Sharon Prost's 
case, by focusing on her availability, the trial court minimized allegations 
of domestic violence by Prost's husband (which had been serious enough 
to merit a civil protection order).149 Surely, a parent who spends limited 
"high quality time"l50 with a child is a more appropriate custodian than 
a parent who has socially undesirable qualities. 
Moreover, it is important to note that societal views have evolved 
concerning children's need for quantity time. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild 
writes that in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a woman's 
place was in the home, child-care experts agreed that the child needed a 
mother's constant care at home. 151 As women's roles have changed, 
however, so has our concept of children's needs: "Nowadays, a child is 
increasingly imagined to need time with other children, to need 'indepen-
dence-training,' not to need 'quantity time' with a parent but only a small 
amount of 'quality time. '''152 
A second problem regarding consideration of time as a factor in 
custody decision-making is that a reliance on availability "freezes" the 
status quo. In other words, it measures the present time constraints of one 
parent against the present availability of the other parent to determine 
146. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 91-92 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 
8, 1992). 
147. [d. at 108. Further, the trial court cites an expert's opinion that the father is 
"indifferent to the human race, does not concern himself with how he offends ... [is] 
intrapersonally retarded ... [and demonstrates] complete indifference to humanity .... " 
[d. at 17-18. 
148. [d. 
149. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 623, 631. See also REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS 
STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 69 
(1989)[hereinafter REPORT OF GENDER BIAS STUDY] ("In determining custody and 
visitation, many judges and family service officers do not consider violence toward women 
relevant. "). 
150. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 28 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992) (opinion of father's expert witness). 
151. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING 
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 230 (1989) [hereinafter HOCHSCHILD] (citing 
BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE 
EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN (1978)). 
152. [d. 
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fulfillment of the present time needs of a child. Yet, any, or all, of these 
factors may change significantly over time. 
Consideration of a parent's current career demands assumes that these 
constraints are reflective of the career as a whole. In the cases of many 
of the professional women above, this assumption may not be warranted. 
For example, although the ordinary demands of a prosecutor may be high, 
the notoriety of the 0.1. Simpson trial makes this trial a singular event. 
Similarly, for Sharon Prost, the Senate confirmation hearings of Justice 
Thomas also presented unique time demands. 153 Likewise, Linda 
Tresnak was at the beginning of her law school career, a time when the 
demands upon her WOUld, most likely, be highest. 154 Thus, a reliance 
on present availability fails to recognize that the present situation may be 
a momentary stage in a lifelong career. 155 
Reliance on time as a factor also freezes the availability of the non-
custodial parent. Gordon Clark, for example, asserts that he is home 
every night by 6: 15 p. m. 156 This ignores the possibility that, in time, he 
might be promoted into a more demanding position, accept a different job, 
or become involved in a new amorous relationship that would take up 
more of his time. Similarly, as is the case for two other ex-husbands 
discussed above, a parent's availability might be related to temporary 
unemployment157 or a current position with flexible hours; both of these 
work situations are subject to change. 
Reliance on present availability also disregards the changing needs of 
children and fails to recognize that children's demands on a parent's time 
vary as a function of each developmental stage. 158 For example, once 
153. In fact, Prost claimed that she regularly left work at 4:30 p.m. when the Senate was 
not in session (as was frequently the case). Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 629. 
154. After completing law school, Tresnak became a psychiatric social worker and 
subsequently remarried. Hancock et al., supra note 29, at 56. 
155. Also, an emphasis on present availability ignores that career demands may vary as 
a function of seasonality or other factors. In another case in which a mother was denied 
custody because of her career demands, the mother worked as a city manager for H & R 
Block. managing 17 offices. "She testified that although she worked forty to fifty hours 
per week during tax season, she may work from ten to thirty hours per week at other 
times, depending on the flow of business .... " Marilyn Hall Mitchell, Note, Family 
Law-Child Custody-Mother's Career May Determine Custody Award to Father, 24 
WAYNE L. REv. 1159, 1166 n.47 (1978) (citing Gulyas v. Gulyas, No. 75-083-748 DC 
(Wayne Co. Cir. Ct .• Oct. 20-21, 1975)). 
156. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1. 
157. Sharon Prost's husband was unemployed for more than two years. Prost v. Greene, 
652 A.2d at 623. Renee B. 's husband had a chronic history of employment problems, and 
it appeared unlikely that he would return to work. The daughter described his employment 
as "he works on the papers for the court." Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. 
op. at 12 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 1992). 
158. See also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at 178 (older children may be less 
desirous of spending overnights at their fathers). For a study of the effect of developmental 
changes on visitation patterns, see id. at 178-80. 
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children reach school age, they are absent from home for a large portion 
of the parent's work day. Moreover, school children's after-school lives 
may quickly fill with extracurricular activities and friendships, thus 
lessening their need and desire to be with a parent. 
A third criticism of reliance on availability as a factor in custody 
decision-making rests on an unspoken assumption that availability is an 
objective and easily measurable criteria. This assumption is, however, 
open to challenge. Conscious and unconscious biases by the parties 
themselves, as well as by decision-makers, may pervade the evaluation of 
availability. Several other issues also complicate the measurement of 
availability: What should be measured? Child care only? Or, child care 
and house work (work performed for the family)? If child care, then what 
types of tasks?159 One problem in emphasizing the more visible caretak-
ing activities is that this tends to minimize all the "invisible" workl60 that 
mothers 161 might perform (such as arranging for baby-sitting or house-
keeper services,162 scheduling doctors' appointments, scheduling play 
dates,163 determining a child's need for new clothes and haircuts, helping 
with school work, planning domestic chores and events, making grocery 
lists, and paying bills). 
Sociologist Arlie Hochschild has made visible the extent of the child 
care and house work that working women perform. Her classic study of 
159. For a list of tasks that one court deems relevant to determination of primary 
caretaker status, see Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 eN. Va. 1981). 
160. The term "invisible," as applied to work, is borrowed from sociological studies of 
comparable worth that suggest that gender bias pervades the evaluation of occupations by 
failing to consider the range of tasks that women perform. See Ronnie Steinberg, Social 
Construction of Skill: Gender, Power, and Comparable Worth, 17 WORK AND OCCUPA-
TIONS 449, 459-63 (1990) ("[T]he prerequisites, tasks, and work context associated with 
women's work are invisible. "). 
161. Hochschild found that only 18% of the men in her sample of 50 working couples 
shared half of the work load in housework, parenting, and management of domestic life. 
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 282. 
162. Marital couples often delegate to the wife the responsibility for organizing child care, 
whether it be the occasional baby-sitter or a more permanent caretaker. This is true even 
when both parents have jobs. KATHRYN C. BACKETT, MOTHERS AND FATHERS: A STUDY 
OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND NEGOTIATION OF PARENTAL BEHAVIOR 191-94 (1982). 
Sharon Prost, for example, was the parent who conducted the search for a live-in child 
care provider. Rather than being credited with this "work" by the judge, however, Prost 
was faulted for listing her mother (rather than her husband) as the emergency contact on 
the required 'parent information form.' Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 625 n.6. 
163. For example, the court-appointed mental health expert intimated that, because Renee 
B. was not available after her daughter's school day, she "farmed out" the girl to friends' 
houses. "[H]er work situation does have the effect of reducing Rebecca's time with her. 
One of the factors involved in Rebecca's greater time with other children relates to the 
baby-sitting element operative in such visits." Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, 
slip. op. at 92 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 1992). Rather than giving credit to the mother for 
arranging for the child's social needs, she was faulted for not meeting the child's needs 
herself. 
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fifty working couples in California from 1980 to 1988 reveals that working 
mothers work "a second shift"; in other words, they work at their job and 
then come home and perform another shift doing housework and child 
care. l64 Hochschild estimates that mothers' second shifts amount to their 
working an extra month of twenty-four-hour days per year. 165 
Moreover, Hochschild suggests that working mothers may actually do 
more family work (housework and child care) than non-working moth-
ers.l66 Furthermore, Hochschild points out that those working women 
who earn more than their husbands tend to participate to a greater extent 
than other working women in the division of labor. 167 Hochschild 
attributes this to the women's subconscious desire to restore power to their 
husbands. 168 
Sharon Prost's case illustrates the possibility of bias in the measure-
ment of "invisible" caretaking tasks. The appellate court determined that 
Prost was so devoted to her career that she neglected her "health, her 
children and her family." 169 To the contrary, Prost remarked: 
I think they [the children] view me as the parent who takes care of 
really their most basic needs. I did their laundry, I cut their nails 
every work [sic], I'd give them haircuts. From the little details of 
the day to the broader aspects of, you know, going to camp or 
whatever, I was just [there] .... 170 
Prost maintains that she read the children bedtime stories and tucked them 
into bed. I7l She adds, "[m]ost of our best times are just spent hanging 
out. ,,172 
Much of the work Prost performed by tending to the children's "basic 
needs" was "invisible" to the judge who focused on the father because he 
was the principal cook for the family. The judge ignored several other 
aspects of Prost's availability-for example, her proximity to her son's day 
164. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151. 
165. [d. at 4. 
166. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 220-26; See also Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, 
Toward a Family Policy: Changes in Mothers' Lives, in THE CHANGING AMERICAN 
FAMILY AND PuBLIC POLICY 157,171 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed., 1988) [hereinafter Epstein, 
Toward a Family Policy] (husbands of working women still perform "only a modest amount 
more of child care and housework than do husbands of wives who are not in the labor 
force"). 
167. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 222. 
168. [d. Furthermore, Hochschild states, "Sensing when their husbands got 'touchy,' 
sensing the fragility of their husbands' 'male ego,' not wanting them to get discouraged or 
depressed, such women restored their men's lost power by waiting on them at home." [d. 
169. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
170. ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 8. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. at 8. 
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care. 173 Instead, the judge faulted her for allowing her husband to take 
the child home from day care when she worked latel74 and for placing 
Prost's mother's name (rather than the child's father's name) on the parent 
notification card as an alternate emergency contact. 175 
In addition, the judge ignored the fifteen months before trial during 
which Prost was the children's primary caretaker. 176 Also, both the trial 
court judge and the appellate judge discounted the work Prost performed 
during their son's infancy (such as nursing and tending to him at night). 
Summarizing the trial court's opinion, the appellate court stated: 
The trial judge made detailed findings of fact attempting to resolve 
the conflicting evidence. The judge found . . . [s jpecijically, 
except during the first several months of Matthew's life, [that] 
Prost and Greene were "full and equal caretakers of Matthew from 
his birth [in 1987] through at least February 1989. "177 
Research on gender bias in the courts reveals that this de-emphasis on a 
mother's primary caretaking may be part of a pattern: 
[I]t appears that as soon as physical custody is contested, any 
weight given to a history of primary caretaking disappears. 
Mothers who have been primary caretakers throughout their child's 
life are subjected to differential and stricter scrutiny, and may lose 
custody if the role of primary caretaker has been assumed, 
however briefly and for whatever reason, by someone else. 178 
Measurement of availability is complicated by other subtle factors. 
Mothers and fathers may attach different meanings to the attentiveness 
required by child care. 179 Or, mothers and fathers may have different 
173. The court, noting the record, states that: "[The couple] placed Matthew in a daycare 
[sic] facility across the street from Prost's office and commuted to and from work together, 
dropping him off and picking him up on the way." 
Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 625 n.6. The judge's attitude may reflect an unawareness of the extent to 
which working women rely on female relatives. Hochschild reveals the frequency with 
which working women (when they do not rely on nannies or housekeepers) tend to call on 
their mothers, mothers-in-law, or other female relatives for child care-even when these 
women themselves worked. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 198. 
176. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. Similarly, the appellate court in Renee B., 611 
N.Y.S.2d 831, ignored the period from 1986 until 1994, when Renee was primary 
custodian. 
177. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624 (emphasis added). Perhaps, the above evaluation 
ignores Prost's contribution because women are expected to perform such tasks, given that 
they have the physical ability to breast-feed. 
178. REPORT OF GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 149, at 72. 
179. Arlie Hochschild illustrates this point by citing the example of a father who claims 
to "share" housework and child care, but his idea of performing child care is expressed by 
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standards regarding child care or housework which may affect their 
availability to their children. For example, one parent may care more 
about how the house looks or how clean the children are, and thereby 
perform more child care or household tasks accordingly. 180 
Further, it becomes important to notice how certain tasks are weighted 
in the measurement of availability. An evaluation of availability in some 
of the cases above appears to rest on gender-based assumptions about the 
traditional roles of mother and father. Thus, the appellate court judge 
faults Sharon Prost for not making dinner for her family and for not eating 
with them. 181 He gives her husband credit for food preparation. 182 
This judge obviously presupposes a very traditional family model with 
traditional gender roles. 
Similarly, the court-appointed mental health expert in Renee B. faults 
Renee for not being available to the daughter after school. 183 It matters 
little that she wakes the daughter and gives her breakfast. 184 Gordon 
Clark faults his ex-wife, similarly, for coming home at 10 p.m. l85 Yet, 
we do not know if she, like Renee, spends time with the children in the 
morning. 
These opinions reveal underlying gender-based assumptions about the 
expected roles of mother and father that may be out of place in contempo-
rary family life. The families of professional women may function 
differently. They may, for instance, alter their children's schedule in 
order to spend more time with them. 186 
Further, subjective bias often emerges in the weight given to the 
amount and type of work that fathers, as compared to mothers, perform. 
Commentators have pointed out a judicial tendency to overrate fathers' 
contributions to caretaking: 
the statement that" [t]he children do fine while I'm working on the house; they muck about 
by themselves." HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 222. 
180. Hochschild identifies a male strategy of "needs reduction." She cites the example 
of one husband who explained that he didn't perform certain tasks (laundry, shopping) 
because he didn't "need" things. "Through his reduction of needs, this man created a great 
void into which his wife stepped with her 'greater need' to see him wear an ironed shirt, 
to furnish their apartment, take his suits to the cleaners, buy his books, and cook his 
dinner." HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 202. 
181. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
182. Id. 
183. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 92 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
184. Id. at 91. 
185. Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1, at Al (citing Gordon Clark's 
Superior Court declaration of February 24, 1995). 
186. As Hochschild describes, based on her empirical study, "[s]upermoms put in long 
hours at the office but kept their children up very late at night to get time with them." 
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 195. See also EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11, 
at 368. 
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Case analysis reveals a tendency to overrate small paternal 
contributions to parenting because they are still so noticeable, and 
to concomitantly over-emphasize lack of total maternal parenting. 
In other words, the emphasis in evaluating mothers is on what they 
do not do, because they are expected to do everything. By this 
standard, men will always look good for doing more than nothing 
and women will always look bad for doing less than every-
thing. 187 
The court in Prost, for example, pointed to the father's "regular 
involvement in school functions" 188 while disregarding the mother's 
"own equal involvement in [the son's] schooling. "189 While Prost's 
husband was unemployed for almost two years, the couple still hired a 
live-in baby-sitter to care for the children. He took over from the baby-
sitter at 5:00 or 5:30. 190 As Prost commented: 
If he was unemployed, at home all day, the question-the lens 
wasn't, 'Well, why wasn't he taking the children during the day?' 
It was, 'Isn't he wonderful? .. , So what he did was wonderful, 
but everything I did was from a lens of how little I did. 191 
Similarly, in Renee B., the court-appointed expert testified that the 
unemployed father was more available. His gender bias against working 
mothers is apparent in his written report: 
Ms. RB is an attorney and has a full-time job. She is available to 
dress Rebecca in the morning and to give her breakfast. In 
contrast, Mr. MB [father] is much more available to spend time 
with Rebecca after school [and] at times of sickness, accidents, and 
187. Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rev. 955, 997 
(1984) (citing Nancy Polikoff, Gender and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the 
Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN 
AND THE STATE 183, 191 (I. Diamond ed., 1983), [hereinafter Polikoff, Gender and Child 
Custody]. See also Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing, supra note 5, at 240-41). 
As Lynn Gold Beacon, of the American Bar Association's Family Law Section 
commented: 
Men are presumed to spend a couple of hours with the kids and when they 
spend more than a couple of hours, we think they're superdads. So when 
you compare a less-than perfect mom to a superdad, I think it's difficult 
to-for the women to win under those circumstances. 
ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 10. 
188. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 627 n.13. 
189. [d. See also Hancock et aI., supra note 29, at 56 ("Judge Taylor praised the father 
for assisting in his child's kindergarten, but made no mention that the same teacher testified 
that Prost was the class's 'surrogate mom'''). 
190. ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 10. 
191. [d. 
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other possible emergencies . ... Although MB's greater 
availability is, in part, a manifestation of a long history of 
occupational difficulties, from Rebecca's point of view her father 
is much more available than her mother and this puts Mr. MB at 
an advantage . . .192 
321 
Subsequently, the mental health expert charged that Renee, "is not herself 
available each day after school . . .. [H1er work situation does have the 
effect of reducing Rebecca's time with her . . .. »193 The expert's 
testimony reflects the traditional role expectation that mothers are to be 
home when their children return after school. 194 
Because of stereotypical gender role expectations, custody decision-
makers may not expect fathers to be involved in child care. As a result, 
fathers' time commitments in housework and child care are accorded 
considerable weight. 195 
A final criticism of reliance on time as a relevant factor in custody 
decision-making is the subjectivity of the assessment by the parties 
themselves. Their measurement may be not unbiased, especially given the 
likelihood of intra-parental conflict and hostility upon divorce. As one 
commentator points out, "[i]n all events, because the [time] test would 
require a prediction of the amount of time each parent would spend with 
the child, it would be very difficult to apply and would invite exaggeration 
and dishonesty in litigation." 196 This commentator presupposes that 
parents consciously might misrepresent the time they spend on caretaking. 
Hochschild's findings suggest, however, that unconscious motivations 
may also playa role in a parent's measurement of child care contributions. 
That is, Hochschild suggests that some families participate in "family 
myths," delusions that serve some unconscious function. l97 One such 
myth is that the marriage is egalitarian and that the husband's workload (in 
terms of housework and child care) is equal to that of the wife. Specifical-
192. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 92. (N.Y. Pam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
193. [d. 
194. See also REPORT OF GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 149, at 63 (half of family 
court judges expressed their belief that mothers should be at home when the children return 
from school). 
195. In a recent South Carolina case, a real estate agent lost custody of her son. The 
mother was described as an "aggressive, competitive individual" who was "not particularly 
family-oriented" (even though she took a year off after her son's birth and was involved 
in his daily care, religious and secular education, music lessons and other activities). The 
court gave considerable weight to the father's domestic activities, which included "making 
the morning coffee, often cooking weekend meals, attending the boy's swim meets and 
sometimes taking him to the doctor." Brecher, supra note 124. 
196. Mnookin, supra note 135, at 285. 
197. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 151, at 44. 
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ly, Hochschild identifies relationships in which (despite an observable 
gender-based inequality in the division of labor), both the husband and 
wife refer to the division of labor as "equal . . . because equality was so 
important to [the wife]. "198 
In sum, parental availability is a problematic criterion by which to 
measure the suitability of a custodial parent. A reliance on time places 
undue emphasis on quantity rather than quality. Reliance on this factor 
inappropriately freezes the status quo in a way that may not be in the 
child's best interests. Also, the evaluation process reveals subjective bias, 
such as gender bias and stereotyped role expectations, on the part of the 
decision-makers and the parties. 
B. THE FEMINIST DOUBLE BIND 
Another perspective on the experience of Marcia Clark (and those of 
the professional women herein) is that it exemplifies gender bias in custody 
decision-making. Divorced professional mothers are being treated 
differently than similarly situated men. These working women are 
expected to be perfect mothers. If they cannot excel in both their work-life 
and family-life, they are penalized and made to choose between them. l99 
Fathers are confronted neither with the expectation of parental perfectibility 
nor the demand that they make a choice. 
The conflicting role expectations for the working mother versus father 
have roots in nineteenth centUry gender ideology. On one hand, imagery 
portrays the hardworking father as a good provider. Mothers, on the other 
hand, suffer from the effects of the social movement of the 
professionalization of motherhood. 
Reviewing the feminist literature on mothering, Nancy Chodorow and 
Susan Contratto200 identify and articulate the theme of maternal perfec-
tion: 
[This includes] a sense that mothers are totally responsible for the 
outcomes of their mothering . . .. Belief in the all-powerful 
mother spawns a recurrent tendency to blame the mother on the 
198. [d. at 58. 
199. This is the meaning of the "desperate bind" to which Beck is referring. Beck, supra 
note 19. See also REPORT OF GENDER BIAS, supra note 149, at 64 (discussing a family 
service officer who criticized a working mother's schedule and threatened to place her child 
in foster care if the mother did not quit her second job and a family court judge who told 
her, "[yJou need to decide whether you want to be a mother or a working woman. "). 
200. Nancy Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in 
RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 191 (Barrie Thome & Marilyn 
Yalom eds., rev. ed. 1992). 
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one hand, and a fantasy of maternal perfectibility on the other . 
201 
323 
Chodorow and Contratto label this the "myth of the perfect mother. »202 
This myth results in a paradoxical treatment of mothers: idealization and 
blame.203 
Chodorow and Contratto do not delve into the historical source of this 
treatment. 204 The source, however, is highly relevant to the legal 
treatment of the professional woman/mother. The idealization of 
mothers derives from nineteenth beliefs about womanhood. Historian 
Barbara Welter identifies "the cult of true womanhood" that surfaced after 
1820.205 According to this view, the "true woman" was supposed to 
possess certain attributes, such as submissiveness and domesticity. 206 
Woman's place was in the home as wife and mother. 207 She was 
supposed to busy herself with domesticity, the most prized virtue. 208 
Women's literature regarded housework as uplifting:209 "[M]any a 
marriage is jeopardized because the wife has not learned to keep 
house. "210 It was woman's job to make the home a cheerful, comfort-
able place.21l This "mystique," according to Welter, "of what woman 
was and ought to be persisted . . . . ,,212 Other social forces, including 
industrialization and urbanization, contributed to the idea of the home as 
a sanctuary from the outside world.2I3 
In the late nineteenth century, women who sought careers, such as 
women physicians, were the object of ridicule and were "a frequent 
inspiration to cartoonists. "214 They were regarded as deviant; the 
popular view was that "any female who did succeed at medicine must be 
201. Id. at 192. 
202. Id. at 191. 
203. Id. at 192-96. 
204. They accept the psychological explanation of idealization as an infantile fantasy. Id. 
at 204. 
205. Barbara Welter, The Cult o/True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966). 
206. Id. at 152, 158-64. Welter highlights four virtues: piety, purity, submissiveness, 
and domesticity. Id. at 152. 
207. Id. at 162. Welter discusses an award-winning article in 1851 that explained that" an 
American woman best shows her patriotism by staying at home." Id. at 172. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 164. 
210. Id. at 167. 
211. Id. at 163. 
212. Id. at 174. 
213. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GooD: 150 YEARS OF 
THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 147-48 (2d ed. 1989). See also RICHARD SENNETT, 
FAMILIES AGAINST THE CITY: MIDDLE CLASS HOMES OF INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO 1872-90 
(1970). 
214. EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 213, at 63. 
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not a lady at all, but some kind of freak. "215 In the twentieth century, 
the working woman would confront remnants of this ideology. 
By the 1920s and 1930s, the professional woman continued to receive 
censure. For example, Deborah Rhode quotes the advice of a therapist to 
women: 
Dr. W.B. Wolfe captured the sentiments of many therapists in the 
late 1920s and early 30s with his queries to the seemingly 
"successful" professional woman. Would she be content to 'take 
her Ph. D. to bed with [her] on cold nights, or [would she] warm 
[her] bones with gilt-edged stocks?' Success or no success, 'there 
[was] in all the world no substitute for the job of mother-
hood.,216 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a diverse range of 
"scientific" experts advised women on the virtues of domesticity and 
motherhood. Motherhood witnessed a professionalization, spurred by the 
birth of domestic science217 and a recognition of the growing importance 
of childhood. 218 In a speech addressed to women, President Theodore 
Roosevelt illustrated this deification of motherhood: 
The good mother, the wise mother ... is more important to the 
community than even the ablest man; her career is more worthy of 
honor and is more useful to the community than the career of any 
man, no matter how successful, can be .... But ... the woman 
who, whether from cowardice, from selfishness, from having a 
false and vacuous ideal shirks her duty as wife and mother, earns 
the right to our contempt, just as does the man who, from any 
motive, fears to do his duty in battle when the country calls 
him.219 
A "mothers' movement" at the end of the century provided an eager 
audience for the experts who were transforming child rearing into a 
science. 220 This mothers' movement, paradoxically, contained elements 
of a feminist backlash; leaders of this movement reproached those women 
who rejected domesticity for a career. 221 
215. Id. at 65. 
216. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 11, at 1170 (citing W. 
WOLFE, A WOMAN'S BEST YEARS: THE ART OF STAYING YOUNG 23, 181 (1935». 
217. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 213, at 141-81. 
218. Id. at 183. 
219. Id. at 190 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, Address to the First International Congress 
in America on the Welfare of the Child, under the auspices of the National Congress of 
Mothers, Wash., D.C., Mar. 1908). 
220. Id. at 191-96. 
221. Id. at 194. 
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In contrast to the elevation of domesticity and motherhood for women, 
a corresponding nineteenth century transformation associated men with 
imagery of the good provider. Sociologist Jessie Bernard explains that the 
structure of our traditional family took shape in the early nineteenth 
century, beginning in the 1830s.222 The industrial revolution spurred the 
development of a specialized male role.223 Formerly, in a subsistence 
economy, both the husband and wife contributed significantly to the 
division of labor.224 With the transition to a market economy, however, 
men were expected to provide to the best of their ability for their family. 
Gender identity for men was associated with the public sphere of work. 
The good provider role envisioned "a hardworking man who spent most 
of his time at his work.,,225 Also, the role encompassed the idea that 
"[h]is work might have been demanding, but he expected it to be . 
,,226 
Bernard identifies the "costs" of the good provider ideology for our 
conceptualization of husbands: 
The most serious cost was perhaps the identification of maleness 
not only with the work site but especially with success in the role 
. . .. To be a man one had to be not only a provider but a good 
provider. Success in the good-provider role came in time to define 
masculinity itself. 227 
Another "cost" of the good provider role, Bernard explains, was the 
exclusion of the attribute of "emotional expressivity. "228 The man was 
not expected to provide emotional comfort, nurturance, or tenderness: 
"[T]he good provider was often, in a way, a kind of emotional parasite. 
Implicit in the definition of the role was that he provided goods and 
material things. Tender loving care was not one of the requirements. "229 
This aspect of the good provider role began to change in the 
1970s.230 Society placed new demands on husbands, including increased 
expressivity and the sharing of household responsibilities and child 
222. Jessie Bernard, The Good-Provider Role: Its Rise and Fall, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 
2 (Jan. 1981). 
223. Id. at 2. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 4. 
226. Id. at 3. 
227. Id. at 4. 
228. Id. at 3. 
229. Id. at 10. 
230. Id. at 10-11. 
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care. 231 Men's behavior in the family began to evolve based on these 
new expectations. 232 
The increase of working wives in the labor force in this century signals 
that women now share the provider role: "[N]ow that she is entering the 
labor force in large numbers, she can once more resume her ancient role, 
this time, like her male counterpart the provider, by way of a monetary 
contribution. "233 With this transformation in the division of labor, 
women's work patterns increasingly resemble men's; men's work patterns 
more closely resemble women's. 234 
Thus, the good provider role has declined in importance for the 
husband-father, and new male role expectations in regard to housework 
and child care have emerged. No correlative decline has occurred, 
however, in the role expectations for the working wife-mother. Although 
she now shares with her husband the role of provider for the family, she 
is still expected to conform to the role of the perfect mother. 
Nineteenth century gender ideology regarding the role of women 
haunts society today in its treatment of women lawyers in the context of 
custody disputes. Custody decision-makers in several of the cases 
discussed above were influenced by traditional gender role expectations. 
The very qualities that contribute to a woman lawyer's success militate 
against her in a custody dispute when her mothering role is evaluated. An 
exploration of several common gender stereotypes is useful in explaining 
how these stereotypes are used to the detriment of women lawyers. 
1. Gender Stereotype: l-\bmen are Responsible for Family Mainte-
nance Tasks. 
One stereotype is that the woman, even if she works, is expected to 
perform traditional gender-based tasks, such as food preparation. The trial 
judge in Prost is appalled that Prost rarely cooks for the family. 235 It 
was a "special event" when Prost came home early to cook dinner.236 
Also, the trial court was influenced by testimony that Prost often ate dinner 
alone, late in the evening, while sitting on the kitchen floor, talking on the 
231. [d. at 10. 
232. In 1981, Bernard notes that the "pace seems intolerably slow." [d. at 11. A decade 
later, Hochschild's research seems to lead to the same conclusion. See HOCHSCHILD, supra 
note 151, at 276 (women report doing 75% of the housework and 80% of the domestic 
management). 
233. Bernard, supra note 222, at 9-10. 
234. KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK, 
CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD 221 & n.1 (1985). 
235. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
236. [d. 
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phone. 231 Even on occasions when Prost cooked dinner, she ate "stand-
ing at the stove or elsewhere in the kitchen, rather than at the table with 
the children. »238 
The image conveyed is that Prost is an inadequate wife and mother. 
She lacks the requisite domestic attributes. Also, she is an uncaring 
mother by neglecting her children's primary needs. She fails to provide 
requisite psychological support and foster family cohesion. Furthermore, 
she is "selfish" (being on the telephone, presumably engaged in personal 
conversations) for not sacrificing her needs in favor of her children's. 
The judge could have arrived at an alternate explanation for Prost's 
behavior, of course. After a hard day at the office, a working mother 
needs transition time, both to "decompress" and to perform all the 
necessary scheduling (family and personal) that she was unable to do 
during the work day. As a busy professional, eating may have no special 
significance to her. She may often eat food while she works as a way of 
making use of precious minutes. Moreover, an attribute which may have 
contributed to her successful career is that she performs several tasks at the 
same time: "[I]n a multitasking world, many feel they are wasting time 
unless they combine eating with another activity. "239 Further, food 
preparation may simply not be one of the many skills that this woman 
possesses or enjoys. 
In contrast to Prost, law student Linda Tresnak succeeds, on appeal, 
because of her domesticity. She is "a fastidious housekeeper. "240 The 
appellate court, approvingly, notes that even as a full-time student, she 
returned home each weekend "to clean house, help with the laundry, cook 
meals, and prepare foods to be served during the following week. "241 
Ironically, her success may have depended, in part, on her husband's lack 
of domesticity. 242 
237. [d. In a subsequent interview, she explained that she sat on the floor because it was 
the nearest place to sit while talking on the phone. ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 9. 
238. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
239. Calmetta Y. Coleman, The Unseemly Secrets of Eating Alone, WALL ST. J., July 6, 
1995, at Bl. Although Coleman refers to the eating habits of single adults, I surmise that 
her observation is applicable to many professionals. However, the habit may conjure up 
different degrees of blameworthiness if we think of a male professional versus a 
professional woman eating alone, after work, late at night after the children have gone to 
bed. 
240. Tresnak, 297 N.W.2d at 113. 
241. [d. 
242. The Iowa Supreme Court stated: "He is not as concerned about household 
cleanliness as Linda. Nor did he display her concern about the children's meals and 
clothing . . . ." [d. 
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2. Gender Stereotype: The Mother Must Perform Certain Symbolic 
Child Care Tasks. 
According to this stereotype, the mother must be the parent who 
performs those child care tasks with special significance. These appear to 
include: (1) picking up the child from school or preschool; (2) being home 
when the child returns after school; (3) putting the children to bed; and (4) 
choreographing special family events. 
Sharon Prost is faulted because her husband brings her son home from 
work when she works late. 243 Renee B. is criticized by the court-
appointed psychologist for not being available to the daughter after 
school,244 for "farm[ing] out" her daughter to friends' houses and relying 
on them for baby-sitting.245 Marcia Clark's husband charges her with 
returning home at 10 p. m. ,246 imp licitly criticizing her failure to put the 
children to bed. 
Conversely, Sharon Prost's husband is given credit for hosting a son's 
birthday party in their home while his wife was working. 247 The 
appellate court in Tresnak, reversing the trial court's denial of custody, 
commends Linda Tresnak for her participation in vacation and recreation 
activities; she "fishes, reads, bakes cookies, bicycles and swims,,248 with 
her sons. 249 
These images harken back to the "myth of the perfect mother. "250 
They idealize the mother and a mother's loving care. Her presence is 
regarded as essential to the child's development. If the mother does not 
perform these child care tasks, she is blamed for this shortcoming. 
Moreover, her absence at these important times is a symbol of her 
psychopathology, per se evidence of her unfitness as a custodian. Her 
psychopathology is also manifest in other ways, discussed below. 
243. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 624. 
244. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 92 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
245. [d. 
246. BoxaIl, Marcia Clark's Husband, supra note 1 (citing Gordon Clark's Superior Court 
declaration of February 24, 1995). For another example in which a mother is faulted for 
not being present at symbolic times during the day, see Steinbach, supra note 124 (citing 
the case of a Mississippi flight attendant who lost custody because her ex-husband had a 
more regular work schedule). 
247. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 630 n. 21. 
248. Tresnak, 297 N.W.2d at 112. 
249. In many of these cases (Le. Clark, Tresnak, Prost) the couple's children are boys. 
One may speculate that gender bias is present in judicial preference for a male custodian. 
Although this is explicit in the trial court award in Tresnak, 297 N.W.2d at 112, it may be 
an implicit factor in other custody denials to mothers. 
250. CHOOOROW & CONTRATTO, supra note 201. 
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3. Gender Stereotype: A llbman's Zealous Commitment to llbrk is 
a Form of Psychopathology. 
In many of the above cases, the woman's devotion to her career is 
viewed as an additional element of unfitness. The trial judge characterizes 
Prost as "driven to succeed" and "intensely dedicated to achieve-
ment. ,,251 The judge criticizes her for returning to work "immediately" 
after her son was born despite a difficult pregnancy.252 In awarding 
custody to the father, the court notes that Prost is "simply more devoted 
to and absorbed by her work and career than anything else . . . . "253 
Similarly, Renee B. is characterized as psychologically unstable. In 
denying her custody, the appellate court based its decision on the opinion 
of a court-appointed expert who said that Renee's "general superior 
intellectual capacities [eclipsed] the more subtle manifestations of 
psychopathology. ,,254 He characterized Renee as "paranoid" 255 and 
"delusional. "256 
Yet, as the trial record reveals, when the expert is cross-examined, he 
agrees that all of Renee's concerns have a factual basis. Her husband 
admitted that he slept in the same bed with the daughter7 and that he 
taped all of the telephone conversations between the daughter and 
Renee. 258 These examples reveal vestiges of the nineteenth century view 
of working women. The fact that a woman works, and is committed to 
her work, signifies that there must be something wrong with her. 
4. Gender Stereotype: Mother Must Be the Constant Loving 
Nurturer. She Must Be Flexible and Accommodating to Family 
Members. 
The above-mentioned cases further reveal the expectation that the 
mother be a constant warm, loving source of affection for family members. 
She must be flexible and accommodating to their needs and desires. The 
professional women described above do not fit these stereotypes. For 
example, a court-appointed psychologist criticizes Renee B. for her 
251. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 625 n. 4. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 629. 
254. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 9 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 16, 20. One may wonder why the appellate judge does not credit Renee with 
being appropriately concerned about her daughter's welfare. 
258. Id. at 36. 
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attempts at humor when describing her daughter's temper tantrums. 259 
To the psychologist, Renee is revealing herself as an uncaring mother. 
Sharon Prost is criticized for her " rigidity "260 and "inflexibility"261 
in terms of her unwillingness to adjust her ex-husband's visitation; she 
became irritated that her husband "barged in" on her scheduled weekend 
with the children.262 Similarly, Marcia Clark's ex-husband criticizes her 
for being furious when he unexpectedly kept the children overnight on 
short notice. 263 
Renee B. is charged with being "temperamental"264 and "attempt[ing] 
to exclude [her ex-husband] from the child's life, "265 as the result of an 
incident where school personnel threw the ex-husband off school premises 
and asked him never to return. 266 Likewise, Prost is criticized for 
"demonstrat[ing] insensitivity"267 to her husband's periods of unemploy-
ment and resultant depression. The traits and actions of these two women 
do not accord with the stereotypes of a submissive, nurturing wife and 
mother. 
Yet, several of these actions are understandable in light of the requisite 
attributes and career demands of a professional woman. The professional 
woman is required to be well-organized and to adhere to a schedule. 
Impromptu, last-minute changes could upset a carefully-crafted accommo-
dation of child care arrangements and work. Also, being temperamental, 
rigid, and inflexible might be positive attributes for a litigator or corporate 
attorney who needs to zealously represent clients. Actions which might 
not be characterized as parental shortcomings for a male professional take 
on a different significance for women: 
For the professional man, frequent absences from home, tardiness 
for dinner, and "overtime" work are not only expected but also 
accepted as evidence that he is . . . a good parent and spouse. 
Such is not the case for the professional woman. 268 
259. Id. at 49. As a two-year-old, the daughter was on a New York City street comer 
having a screaming fit. When a passer-by confronted the mother, she flippantly responded, 
"I beat her on a[n] hourly basis. Now let me pass." Commenting on the opinion of the 
court-appointed expert, the mother's expert commented, "he has no sense of humor." 
260. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 625. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 628 n. 15. 
263. Rabin, supra note 16, at B04. 
264. Renee B. v. Michael B., 611 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
265. Id. 
266. Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 106 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 8, 
1992). 
267. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 625. 
268. Kaufman, supra note 44, at 156. 
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Another common expectation is that the woman should adjust to her 
husband's career. For example, during the Tresnak marriage, the 
Tresnaks moved twice in order to accommodate Jim's teaching career. 269 
Yet, paradoxically, the trial court objected to Linda attending law school, 
in part, because she would have to move the children to a different state 
for three years,270 and then, possibly, move them again to start her 
career. 271 
In short, these cases reveal that decision-makers have expectations of 
mothers that they do not have of fathers. Gender ideology of the perfect 
mother leads us to blame these working women when they fail to meet 
these expectations. This blame sometimes results in the harshest of 
penalties, custody deprivation. 
IV. Conclusion 
This article has highlighted a small number of cases in which women 
have been denied custody because of their demanding careers. Admittedly, 
the number of divorced women affected by this problem is unknown. 
Cases in which custody or visitation is contested make up only a small 
percentage of custody cases.272 To date, empirical research does not 
reveal the extent to which career demands serve as the grounds for the 
contest. This study underscores the need to conduct such research. 
This article, however, accurately identifies an issue confronting at least 
some divorced women. This issue may well assume greater proportions in 
the future. More women are entering the professions;273 more women 
are entering the legal profession, in particular. 274 Many women are 
269. Tresnak, 297 N. W. 2d at 110. 
270. [d. at 111. 
271. [d. 
272. Approximately 10%-25% of all custody cases are contested. See MACCOBY & 
MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at 134, 272; Robert W. Hansen, The Role and Rights oj Children 
in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAM. L. 1, 2 (1966). 
273. Currently, professional and managerial women comprise more than one out of every 
four employed women. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 42 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGs 174 (Jan. 
1995). (Table 10: "Employed Persons by Occupation, Race and Sex") (women constitute 
28.7% of the total in managerial and professional specialties for 1994). For slightly earlier 
data, see Kaufman, supra note 44, at 149 (women constitute approximately 20% of total 
in managerial and professional specialties). 
274. The number of women professionals, especially legal professionals, has escalated 
dramatically in the past two decades. In a speech to the American Association of 
University Women in March 1995, Senator Moseley-Braun pointed out that women 
architects comprised 3% of the profession in 1972 versus 19% in 1993; women physicians 
constituted 10% of the profession in 1972 versus 22% in 1993; women lawyers comprised 
4 % of the bar in 1972 versus 23 % in 1993. Basil Talbott, Moseley-Braun Points to Gains 
jor Women, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at 20. For earlier data, see GERSON, 
supra note 234, at 238-39 (1985). 
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likely to be divorced mothers,275 and a high percentage of divorced 
mothers work. 276 
This article will now suggest several tentative implications of this 
research, bearing in mind the methodological caveat regarding the 
unknown magnitude of the problem. First, this piece lends support to the 
recognition of gender bias in the legal treatment of working mothers. 
Commentators have theorized that such bias may be operative. m This 
research augments the number of cases reflecting such bias. 278 
Survey data also substantiate the existence of gender bias. 279 In 
particular, empirical research reveals that judicial decisions reflect 
traditional attitudes toward working mothers. 280 One study reports that 
half of the judges surveyed expressed such stereotypical beliefs as, 
"[m]others should be home when their school-age children get home from 
schooL "281 Almost half also agreed that, "[a] preschool child is likely 
to suffer if his/her mother works.,,282 Noting that parenting by mothers 
This number will continue to rise; and women now comprise approximately 40% of 
graduating law students annually. Chambers, supra note 11, at 256. See also Rhode, 
Gender & Professional Roles, supra note 11, at 39, 58 (placing the percentage of new 
entrants at 45%). 
275. In 1993,5,687,000 children under 18 were living with a divorced mother; 950,000 
were living with a divorced father. Of those children, 237,000 have mothers with graduate 
or professional degrees; 3,989,000 children have divorced mothers who are employed. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS, March 1993, Table 6, at 36. 
276. Approximately 80% of divorced mothers work. Kingsley Davis, Wives and Work: 
A Theory of the Sex-Role Revolution and Its Consequences, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN, AND 
THE NEW FAMILIES 67, 81 (Sanford M. Dornbusch & Myra H. Strober eds., 1988) (in 
1985, 83.4 % of divorced women with children aged 6-17 years old were in the labor 
force). 
277. Becker, supra note 4, at 171; Polikoff, Gender and Child Custody, supra note 187, 
at 188-89; Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing, supra note 5, at 239-41. 
278. For cases of custody denials to a working mother that were upheld on appeal, see 
Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589 (Kan. 1978) (businesswoman); Gulyas v. Gulyas, 254 
N.W.2d 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (supervisor); Chastain v. Chastain, 632 S.W.2d 291 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (nature of employment unspecified); Leach v. Leach, 660 S.W.2d 
761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (secretary); Estelle v. Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1979) (nature of employment unspecified); Lewis v. Lewis, 219 N. W.2d 910 (Neb. 1974) 
(medical student); Hansen v. Hansen, 327 N.W.2d 47 (S.D. 1982) (broker); McCreery v. 
McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167 (Va. 1977) (government employee). 
For cases of custody denials to a working mother that were reversed on appeal, see 
Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (nurse); Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 
P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (architect); Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 
1983) (nature of employment unspecified). 
279. See REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 149, at 63-64 (1989) (state-
wide study of family law attorneys, general attorneys, probate judges (who handle family 
matters in that state), and family service officers). 
280. Id. at 63. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
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is scrutinized more closely than that by fathers when custody is contest-
ed,283 these researchers concluded: "Double standards are particularly 
a problem in the areas of work outside the home, temporary relinquishment 
of custody, and dating and cohabitation. "284 
Gender bias may stem from decision-makers' own beliefs about 
traditional roles for mothers and fathers. Alternatively, gender bias may 
result from decision-makers' personal experiences with marriage and 
divorce.285 Another possible explanation is that it may derive from an 
anti-feminist backlash: 286 
[M]any people feel threatened by the vitality and productivity of 
the people who accomplish the demands of multiple roles. In a 
society in which until very recently people believed that the typical 
American woman was incapable of balancing a checkbook or 
driving a van, women's new competence as bank officers and 
truck drivers may encounter resistance. 287 
This sentiment may be directed especially toward women in high-level 
careers.288 People may feel that it is quite "inappropriate"289 that 
women are employed in these prestigious positions, and they resent the 
status and money that these women earn. 
A possible remedy to combat gender bias in the family courts is 
"consciousness raising" for legal and social service personnel. The 
Massachusetts Gender Bias Committee recommended the development of 
such programs, which would be made mandatory for "probate [family] 
judges, family service officers, and court clinic staff. ,,290 The Commit-
tee also recommended Continuing Legal Education courses on gender bias 
for attorneys generally. 291 Although it is not easy to change deep-rooted 
beliefs, such programs certainly would constitute a step in the right 
direction. 
283. [d. 
284. [d. (emphasis added). 
285. The California gender bias study found 32.5% of judges-respondents "have 
experienced divorce and bring the memories of that experience with them to the bench." 
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 142, Tab 5 at 4. 
286. For the classic work on this phenomenon, see generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: 
THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991). Faludi discusses the 
backlash against working women in the 1980s in terms of anti-daycare sentiment, especially 
the myth that day care poses a high risk of child abuse and developmental problems. [d. 
at 41-45. 
287. Epstein, Toward a Family Policy, supra note 166, at 164. 
288. [d. at 165. 
289. [d. 
290. REPORT OF GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 149, at 73. 
291. [d. 
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Another remedy is to encourage the divorcing parties to attempt to 
work out their differences themselves without litigation. This would take 
the matter of custody out of the hands of possibly biased decision-makers. 
Admittedly, although this suggestion might prove workable for some 
parties, in cases of disputes that are "100 year wars, ,,292 it is unlikely to 
be successful. 
U sing mediation by a neutral third party is yet another suggestion. 293 
This idea, however, is similarly no panacea. Mediators, too, may have 
gender bias. This becomes especially problematic if mediators make 
recommendations to the court, a practice permitted in some jurisdic-
tions. 294 Mandatory mediation also may constrain the parties to reach a 
resolution without full consideration of long-range consequences. 295 
Further, mediation does not work well in cases when the parties have 
unequal bargaining power, especially in cases of battering. 2% 
Second, this article suggests that custody determinations based on 
gender-neutral, "objective" criteria may have significant shortcomings. 
That is, reliance on the factor of time or the related factor of parental 
availability is a mine-field strewn with problems of subjectivity and 
speculation. Moreover, gender-based stereotypes regarding the proper 
roles for men and women may enter into measurement of "neutral" 
factors. The existence of attitudes deriving from a time when men were 
the sole breadwinners and women were homemakers/mothers may result 
in mothers being censured for a failure to conform to an idealized 
standard, whereas fathers may be accorded considerable approval for their 
contributions because they have deviated from traditional role expectations. 
If parental availability is to enter into custody decision-making, either 
explicitly or implicitly, then we must exercise considerable caution in our 
292. This is how a mental health expert characterized the custody battle between Renee 
B. and Michael B. See Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 5272186, slip. op. at 3 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. May 8, 1992). 
293. This was the solution posed by an ABC News correspondent who interviewed Sharon 
Prost. See ABC Transcript, supra note 28, at 10. 
294. On this practice, see McLaughlin v. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, 140 Cal. App.3d 
473, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)(if court-appointed mediator makes recommendation to the 
court pursuant to local court rule, then due process guarantees the right to cross-
examination) . 
295. REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 149, at 24. 
296. See, e.g., Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered 
Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272 (1992); Charlotte Germane et aI., Mandatory 
Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1985); Trina Grillo, The Mediation 
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545 (1991); Barbara J. Hart, 
Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Women and Children in Custody 
Mediation, 4 MEDIATION Q. 7 (1987); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: 
The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 
(1984). 
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evaluation. We need to be especially careful in our evaluation of families 
with dual career parents. Detenninations of primary caretaker are 
complicated when both parents work. 2CJ7 These families may have 
negotiated a division of labor that is far from traditional; the concept of 
"primary" caretaker may not be meaningful when applied to these families. 
We also need to recognize that "parental availability" may function as 
strategic behavior in the divorce bargaining process. 298 That is, fathers 
may demand sole or joint custody, or increased visitation, because they 
hope to lessen the amount of their child support. It may have been more 
than coincidental that Gordon Clark's request for primary custody came on 
the heels of his ex-wife's request for increased support. 
Some statutes link child support awards to custody arrangements, either 
explicitly or implicitly. 299 This linkage results in the allocation of 
support being based on the number of nights the child sleeps in a parent's 
home. In a custody contest, then, each parent is motivated by financial 
factors to emphasize the extent of his/her child-care responsibilities, 
especially the time he/she spends with the child. Commentators have 
urged that the statutory linkage of support and custody be modified or 
297. For example, Homer Clark suggests that the determination of the primary caretaker 
may be easy when the woman is a traditional homemaker, but it becomes more difficult 
when both parents work. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 801-02 (2d ed. 1988). 
298. For a discussion of the linkage between money and custody and, also, of "strategic 
behavior" in the bargaining process, see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at 44-48, 
154-61. 
299. For example, CAL. CIV. CODE §4724 (repealed 1990) formerly permitted the court 
to reduce the mandatory minimum child support if a parent was awarded 30% or more 
custodial or visitation time with the child. Also, CAL Crv. CODE §4700(b) (repealed 1990) 
permitted a custodial parent to recover child care expenses if the noncustodial parent failed 
to fulfill caretaking responsibilities. A study of gender bias in California courts 
recommended that the former statute be modified or repealed and that procedures for 
recovery of expenses be improved. ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 142, Tab 5 at 
23 (regarding modification/repeal), 24 (regarding recovery of expenses). With the 
enactment of CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West 1994), new statewide guidelines for 
determining child support take into account "the approximate percentage of time" that a 
parent has "primary physical responsibility for the children." CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 4055(b)(1)(D) (West 1994). This appears to be a modest improvement, at best. Parents 
still must estimate their time with the child. 
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repealed3°O in order to decrease the likelihood that child support be 
utilized as a bargaining chip in custody disputes. 
Decoupling support and visitation may also be in the children's 
interests in that it might help the children maintain contact with both 
parents. For example, a mother would not feel that she needs to limit a 
child's overnight visitation out of the fear that any increase in visitation 
with the child's father will lessen her child support. 
Third, this study, although limited to the lives of a few professional 
women, brings into focus the difficulties some professional women 
experience regarding the work/family conflict and suggests a need for 
improved workplace accommodations. Women make significant efforts to 
meet the demands of both their private and professional lives. Their 
efforts are all the more commendable given that, despite their employment 
in the public sphere, women still perform the majority of child-rearing and 
housework in the private sphere. 
We need to explore the empirical basis (or lack thereof) 30 I for the 
occasional judicial condemnation of working women. Psychological 
research fails to substantiate that maternal employment has harmful effects 
on children. 302 To the contrary, data reveal the positive consequences 
for children of a mother's employment. Research indicates that maternal 
300. See, e.g., the committee fmdings in ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 142, 
Tab 5 at 23. The committee writes: 
[T]he interplay between custody and support adversely affects the parent 
with primary custody, usually the mother, in two ways. First, the initial 
calculation of the award results in a lower award based on the time that is 
spent by the other parent with the child even though that may not have any 
bearing on the actual costs borne by the primary custodian. Second, the 
underlying custody arrangement upon which the support award is based may 
be honored more in the breach. 
Id. at 21 (citing a family law specialist who observes that fathers often tend not to see their 
children subsequent to the divorce as much as they projected, whereas mothers tend to have 
physical custody full time but less support). 
301. It is interesting to scrutinize the treatment by the decision-makers' herein of the issue 
of the children's adjustment to their mother's career demands. For example, despite 
fmding that Sharon Prost's children were "charming, bright and healthy youngsters" (Prost 
v. Greene, 652 A.2d at 625), the trial court awarded custody to her husband. And, despite 
testimony that Renee's daughter "continues to thrive" (Renee B. v. Michael B., No. V 
5272186, slip op. at 14 (N.Y. Fam Ct. May 8, 1992)), the appellate court awarded custody 
to the father. Thus, courts denied the mother custody without proof of any evidence of 
harm to the children stemming from the mother's career. 
302. See Harriet Nerlove Mischel & Robert Fuhr, Maternal Employment: Its Psychologi-
cal Effects on Children and Their Families, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN, AND THE NEW 
FAMILIES 191 (Sanford M. Dornbusch & Myra H. Strover eds. 1988) (reviewing the 
literature). See also Glenna Spitze, Women's Employment and Family Relations: A 
Review, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 607-09 (1988). In addition, Epstein points out that 
studies that do fmd harmful effects are based on faulty methodology by failing to 
differentiate the type of jobs, the mother's education, economic level or work experience. 
Epstein, Toward a Family Policy, supra note 166, at 175. 
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employment correlates with an increase in children's cognitive and social 
development; 303 more flexibility in their sex-role perceptions;304 expan-
sion of children's stereotypical masculine and feminine personality 
traits;305 and better personality adjustment. 306 Working mothers 
provide role models for daughters and expanded occupational options for 
sons. 307 Further, studies report that mothers who work full-time are 
happier and healthier than those who are unemployed or employed part-
time,308 which also has a positive effect on children's development. 
If, indeed, maternal employment has positive consequences for 
children, then we need more support for women to deal with the 
work/family conflict. For example, we need an improved parental and 
family leave policy on the part of government309 and private sector 
employers. 310 The federal family leave policy has been criticized for 
many reasons: the allotted amount of time for leave is inadequate;311 it 
has no provisions for wage replacement312 or the accrual of seniority 
benefits;313 and it limits benefits to certain parents. 314 
In addition, more employers need to offer part-time work315 or 
flexible schedules316 in order to accommodate the childbearing and child-
rearing periods when family demands are highest. Better coordination of 
303. Mischel & Fuhr, supra note 302, at 192. 
304. Id. at 200. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. at 20l. 
307. Id. Adult sons of working mothers also had higher educational aspirations. [d. 
308. Id. at 203. 
309. The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601-54 (West Supp. 1995) 
(requiring employers of 50 or more to provide job security and health and retirement 
benefits to eligible employees), is a step in the right direction; but it has limitations. See 
infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text. 
310. See Project, Law Firms and Lawyers With Children, supra note 11, at 1295-98 
(policy recommendations for law firm-employers). 
311. Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprintfor Family Leave, 
30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 341 (1993). 
312. [d. at 341-42. See also Donna Lenoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. 1. GENDER 
& L. 39, 53 (1994). 
313. Christina Duarte, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Paying the Price for 
an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. LOUISVILLE 1. FAM. L. 833, 846 (1994). 
314. Dowd, supra note 311, at 342. Dowd points out that low-income, single, African-
American mothers who care for extended family members are penalized. Id. 
315. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 1245 (employers should make available option to 
work part-time for two or three years); Gellis, supra note 44, at 957 (women lawyers 
complained that the lack of part-time opportunities was an obstacle to success); Rhode, 
Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 11, at 1206. 
316. Abrams, supra note 10, at 1241; Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with Children, 
supra note 11, at 1296; Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 11, at 
1206. 
338 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:2 
school schedules, the work day, and holidays is necessary. 317 Good day 
care facilities,318 especially in-house day care or day care referral,319 
are essential. The government might encourage employers to accommo-
date family needs by the provision of tax incentives. 320 
Sociologist Cynthia Fuchs Epstein urges that the workplace and family 
"be considered an interactive unit. "321 "Above all," she writes, "what 
we need from government is symbolic leadership that helps to legitimate 
the role of the employed mother, and, in so doing, weaken the contradicto-
ry norms that make life for working women ... more difficult. "322 She 
adds, "[t]his is not only a 'woman's problem,' but a social problem. "323 
317. For example, few institutions make provisions for child care during school holidays 
or administrative "in-service" days when parents may be working. See EpSTEIN, WOMEN 
IN LAW, supra note 11, at 379; Epstein, Toward a Family Policy, supra note 166, at 185. 
See also Work Week, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1995, at Al (study of 1,680 parents reveals 
that 25 % of parents report problems with baby-sitting schedules during August, 20 % of 
parents face such problems in December, followed by those experiencing problems in June 
and July). 
318. EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11, at 372 (respondent believes Wall Street 
ought to have day care centers); Gellis, supra note 44, at 957; Project, Lawyers and Law 
Firms With Children, supra note 11, at 1298. 
319. Project, Lawyers and Law Firms With Children, supra note 11, at 1298. 
320. EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11, at 379; Rhode, Perspectives on 
Professional Women, supra note 11, at 1206. 
321. Epstein, Toward a Family Policy, supra note 166, at 185. 
322. Id. at 186. 
323. EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 11, at 379. 
